When addressing the terrorist problem we, the US, seem to be very
self-centered, as if were the only ones on the terrorist hit list. It may come
naturally, but as we account for all of the terrorist acts committed against the
United States, we tend to forget how many others are also suffering terrorist
attacks, Russia, Germany, France, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, India comes to mind,
and the list goes on. One of my correspondents wrote, "Indeed! We tend to
ignore those because they touch us less. This is indeed a world war, at least
geographically, far larger than the Great War and World War 2." Consequently,
we need to have the cooperation of all those under attack. With the pre-emptive
strike against Iraq we have muddied the waters of cooperation with some of our
finest allies--take a big swallow--the French and the Germans. The French
especially (see The Atlantic, Nov. 04, "Follow the Mullahs"). After the 1986
wave of terror attacks in Paris the French engaged in forensic theology,
sometimes known as "ideological surveillance." It involves minute examination
of terrorist messages (too difficult here to go into detail), but it helped the
French "to identify and disrupt a number of militant cells and to prevent more
than twenty-five planned attacks."
Maybe we have approached the anti-terrorist war the wrong way. We have seen
time an time again, that on several occasions the Iraqi terrorists had insider
information, inside the Iraqi government, inside the U.S. facilities, inside
Iraqi militaries. We have seen middle level Iraqi police officers either walk
off their jobs or join the opposition.
We have a serious counterintelligence problem in Iraq with too many
coalition contractors, and international news organizations among US elements.
It appears as if the CIA and DIA had no informant net in Iraq before the
pre-emptive strike, and had great difficulty creating such networks after "
mission accomplished" was proclaimed. Now, years later, the terrorists have
established a foothold, a reputation for punishing all those potential assets
with death threat or assassination. That makes for difficult source recruiting
by our intel lads.
We are approaching terrorism as we had approached Cold War opposing world
powers, land powers with well-established governments and territory to defend--
terrorists have none of these. Our intelligence organizations, and the military
, are looking at territory to "secure," as if terrorists have territory. We
lack not only qualified US linguists, we seem to lack an understanding,
according to one of my correspondents, an understanding of the "ideologically/
philosophically, and the radical nature of the Islamists. We have "failed to
correctly work with moderates in affected regions, relying instead on
applications of "things democratic" while failing to take into account cultures,
heritage, mores, traditions, etc far older than our Founding Patriots or the
Reformation, the Age of Enlightenment, et cetera, while plying the masses in
these areas with visions of materialism and modernity. No wonder the radicals
have a field day with the "in the street types", the uneducated, the zealot,
led by their fanatical leadership. That outcome occurred precisely in Iran
with the outcome of the Hostage Crisis. We failed at the highest of levels to
heed warnings and "locally prevailing conditions."
Our HUMINT effectiveness is lessened by the rapid turnover of case officers.
Intel assets must have case officers on the street for extended periods--years
, not months--to feel confident that there is concern for their longevity.
Aside from that, case officers need time on the street to operate effectively--
and they must not only be fluent in the language of their area of operation,
they must feel at ease operating in cultures, heritage, mores, and traditions
that differ considerably from those of the United States.
As one of my fellow case officers used to say, "You've got to make your
prior planning in advance." We failed to do that.